Facilitators of criminal networks

What tasks do facilitators perform?

Our study suggests that many members of criminal networks appear to have a substantial interest in using facilitators. Access to such facilitators is limited, but they can be found in all studied sectors. These mainly include the criminal justice system, numerous local government administrations, banking and finance, real estate, incorporation, bookkeeping and accounting services, legal services, security and surveillance, and transport. Overall, the identified cases occur in most regions of Sweden. This is therefore not solely a metropolitan phenomenon. The degree of activity among the identified facilitators ranges from sporadic, brief assistance to long-term and frequent assistance provided to numerous members of different criminal networks.

The material as a whole shows that, in some areas, facilitators are more likely to assist criminal networks. Such professionals have frequent contacts with criminal actors, are exposed to threats or other pressure to a significant degree or receive remuneration that is tied to their number of clients. Facilitators mainly provide information to members of criminal networks, which is in line with previous studies. This information can be of very different kinds, including sensitive personal data, information about what public authorities or municipalities know about a criminal network, or more strategic information regarding potential criminal activity. Such information may also consist of warnings or instructions relayed to the criminal network from detained or imprisoned members. Such information allows them to coordinate their testimony and complicate investigations. One important observation is that information sought from facilitators need not be secret to be valuable. Rather, accumulated information and insider knowledge makes such information sensitive and useful to members of criminal networks.

Professionals also facilitate logistics by smuggling, transporting or storing illegal goods. Facilitators may also create legitimate covers by generating credible documentation or certificates, or by providing companies which are used to commit crimes, as well as by identifying criminal schemes which appear as legitimate business activity. In some cases, facilitators are also needed to handle criminal proceeds, which public anti-money laundering measures have made more difficult for criminal networks. Finally, some facilitators even issue favourable decisions - they deviate from procurement procedures or other important decisions, fail to report crimes, or facilitate improper payments from welfare systems or the private sector.

Our survey shows the facilitators are asked to perform a broad array of tasks of varying complexity. These range from logistical tasks, which the criminal network might have performed on its own or learned, to complex assignments which only a facilitator could perform, especially influencing the outcome of certain decisions and accessing sensitive information.

How do criminal networks identify, recruit and retain facilitators?

Members of criminal networks vary in their ability to identify, recruit and retain facilitators. Most individuals have limited contacts and opportunities, but some are able to develop new contacts and create favourable opportunities for encountering potential facilitators who are amenable to persuasion. Regardless of ability, everyone seems to begin by searching, in their own network and the networks of those close to them, for contacts with legal-related positions or mandates that might be exploitable. Among the cases that have been detected, many involve facilitators who are related to members of criminal networks, but childhood friends and customers of members criminal networks are also common, while being more difficult to detect. In some cases, facilitators encounter criminals while engaging in side jobs, e.g., secondary employment or non-profit work.

Our study shows that securing facilitators confers status among members of criminal networks. Even when the information provided by the facilitator is widely shared or their decisions benefit numerous network members, such a contact is jealously guarded. Facilitators thus often remain anonymous vis-à-vis others in the network. Ensuring that this relationship appears exclusive is also a means of recruiting facilitators. The most cunning operators build such relationships over time, doing fun things together with the facilitator or showing off a luxury lifestyle. The criminal element is downplayed or trivialised, in order to give the facilitator a false impression of the risks and harm involved in providing assistance. In some cases, criminals encourage potential facilitators to believe that their abilities are not sufficiently appreciated at work in order to flatter them or turn them against their employer.

Facilitators can be men or women. Their motives for facilitating criminal activity can vary. The present study identifies four different types of facilitators: manipulated, developed, profit driven and placed. Manipulated facilitators often provide assistance to members of criminal networks without being aware. While seeking to do the right thing, they are fooled into helping. Such individuals often work in client-centred professions, such as the Prison and Probation Service or social services. Developed facilitators are the largest category in the material. They started their position without any plan to become facilitators, but are contacted as a result of it.

Profit driven facilitators accept bribes or fees to provide assistance, and they are extremely conscious of what they are doing. Such facilitators often carry out assignments for several different individuals, and sometimes for different criminal networks. Despite the advantages of having an exclusive relationship with a facilitator, members of criminal networks do tolerate facilitators who provide assistance to others, especially when the facilitator has unusual knowledge which could expand the network's criminal business activities or affect penalties or other sanctions. Finally, placed facilitators, referred to as infiltrators in some previous studies, have been encouraged or, in rare cases, volunteered to apply for a job or assignment in order to serve as a facilitator. These individuals are rarely members of the network, but can be found on its periphery or among its members’ closest contacts (family, immediate relatives, childhood friends).

Manipulated and developed facilitators have particularly unequal relationships with the member of the criminal network. The latter decides and directs, despite the initial appearance of a pleasant and friendly relation. To maintain this relationship, the member of a criminal network may place regular orders and keep in close contact with the facilitator.

Our study suggests that facilitators have a hard time quitting, especially if they did not have a close relationship with the member of criminal network beforehand. Threats and other pressure are applied, in particular to expose the facilitator to his/her employer. The intimidation capital of the criminal network also makes it difficult to say no, once one has become a facilitator.

What impact do facilitators have on workplace activities and the working environment?

Facilitators can enable, streamline and diversify criminal business activities, putting more people at risk of crime. They can also make crimes more difficult to detect, permitting them to continue for longer periods. In addition, such behaviour can have serious consequences for the organisations where facilitators work. In some cases included in the study, incorrect decisions were taken and confidential personal data were disclosed, impacting the ability of several organisations to perform their assignments. The most serious damage is seen in the criminal justice system and social services, where victims of crime and vulnerable people are affected, and rule of law as well as the so-called social contract are ultimately threatened.

Even if only a few instances have been detected, they can diminish trust in the organisation in question, causing damage that therefore exceeds any immediate economic loss. Public services, in particular, require the trust of the citizenry. Public and private sector actors engaged in collaboration must also be able to trust each other. Otherwise, the isolated cases with serious consequences that have been detected risk reducing actors’ willingness to share information. Finally, such activities have a negative impact on the working environment. The interviews illustrate how the activities of facilitators can sow distrust and anxiety among colleagues and managers.

How do employers prevent, detect and manage facilitators?

This study shows that it is difficult for employers to detect and investigate facilitators. Employers have various degrees of experience with such investigations and varying degrees of authority to carry them out. Employers in the criminal justice system have extensive capabilities, while smaller municipalities rarely have designated functions for such work. In the private sector, the possibilities for investigation can vary greatly, depending on the nature of the activity, the size of the company, etc.

Some interviewees request greater powers to carry out background checks during recruitment and employment. Others question the effectiveness of the controls. However, many interviewees agree on the importance of following recruitment procedures, with a particular focus on asking the right questions at interviews along with careful reference and CV checks. The aim is to identify vulnerabilities, but these also change during the course of employment. Moreover, the findings suggest that many facilitators receive requests from criminal networks after being hired.

Facilitators rarely speak with employers about their situation and what they have done. More often, colleagues or line managers take notice and pass on such information internally. Employers also react differently to indications that something is amiss, and interviewees describe having to push and pester before such indications are investigated further in some cases. Larger and more experienced employers may be better prepared, with established systems to detect new irregularities, including facilitators. This often involves monitoring or conducting searches in transaction flows and data logs, or reviewing different types of irregularities which have been flagged in business systems. Such employers may also have more clearly indicated channels for internal and external reporting of suspected irregularities. Law enforcement agencies, when suspicions of contact with criminal networks arise in the course of their work, can also report cases or employees.

With some exceptions (including the criminal justice system, major banks and other actors with established internal investigation functions and good access to data), employers generally find it difficult to investigate reports and indications concerning facilitators. Criminal investigation authorities hold the mandate to investigate, but they are not always notified. In addition, a preliminary investigation is not always carried about, and cases are often less prioritised than more serious crimes. The likelihood of launching a criminal investigation increases when informal preliminary contact with the police is made to discuss the matter. Without a criminal investigation, cases involving facilitators are often dealt with under labour law by dismissing or offering the person a financial settlement to terminate their employment. In some professions, associations, licensing services and disciplinary boards can take strong action, especially against professionals who have violated existing codes of conduct or regulations. Such bodies generally have little investigative capability, and rely on reports from within their industry or from the criminal justice system. They can demand rectification, or bar people from the profession.